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CORRESPONDENCE
Letters to the Editor
Evidence-Based
Medicine and Clinical
Judgment: An Imaginary Divide
The study by Pereira et al. (1) and the accompanying commentary
by Ben-Yehuda (2) once again bring to the fore some often-raised
arguments against evidence-based medicine. Detractors of
evidence-based medicine tend to imbue “clinical judgment” with
an aura, which barely falls short of the divine, by attributing
intangible powers to clinicians. This view of clinical judgment is
more about the clinician than about judgment. In reality, individ-
uals, clinicians, or otherwise, are swayed more by anecdotal
experience (3); as a result, they are more prone to systematic errors
while making judgments under situations of uncertainty (4).
Evidence from clinical trials, if anything, adds objectivity, reduces
bias, and refines a clinician’s ability to make decisions.
In the study by Pereira et al. (1), the participating clinicians
were not in agreement with the random allocation in more than
half the patients. As pointed out by the investigators, the different
prevalence of 3-vessel disease and the complexity of lesions were
primarily responsible for this situation. Stated simply, the clini-
cians were (justifiably) reluctant to send patients with complex
lesions and 3-vessel disease for angioplasty, because they were
aware of the data that these patients would not have the best results
with angioplasty. Numbers permitting, subgroup analysis of the
trial would probably bear out these clinicians’ concerns. Therefore,
what has been somewhat mystically termed “clinical judgment” is
nothing but the correct interpretation of available data by discern-
ing cardiologists.
It is important for the scientific community to recognize that
there is in fact no real disconnect between evidence-based medi-
cine and an individual clinician’s judgment. Gone are the days
when a few towering experts drew on personal experience to make
clinical decisions. Good clinical judgment in the present day has
evolved into the clinician’s ability to appropriately interpret and
incorporate available evidence in the day-to-day management of
patients. Of course, some clinicians will be better at this than
others!
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Reply
We appreciate Dr. Karthikeyan’s interest in our study on the
predictive power of clinical judgment in chronic coronary artery
disease (1). We agree with his opinion that there is in fact no real
disconnect between evidence-based medicine and an individual
clinician’s judgment and that evidence from clinical trials helps add
objectivity, reduces bias, and refines a clinician’s ability to make
decisions.
Clinical judgment, far from a mystical definition, is the result of
a complex equation that takes into account objective data from
biochemical tests, imaging studies, and a patient’s history. It also
uses subjective information acquired by the physician over the
course of the patient–physician relationship.
We disagree, however, with the view that the different preva-
lence of 3-vessel disease and the complexity of lesions were
primarily responsible for the nonconcordance between a clinician’s
treatment option and the randomization process. Furthermore,
unlike what Dr. Karthikeyan affirmed, this has not been pointed
out in our report. In fact, a careful examination of Table 3 from our
study (1) would allow the observation that lesion morphology
distribution in patients treated by percutaneous coronary interven-
tion (PCI) was not significantly different between concordant and
discordant groups, and even the concordant group treated by PCI
had an almost 50% prevalence of patients with 3-vessel disease.
Angiographic findings were certainly used in the decision process.
However, it should be emphasized that the angiographic variables
that were investigated explained a very small percentage of our
model’s overall variance. This means that clinical judgment either
uses other variables not investigated in our study or it is capable of
deriving information from higher-order interactions using the
variables available from imaging examinations (i.e., angiographic
findings) and cardiovascular risk factors that a patient may present.
In fact, it probably uses both and has the capability of integrating
all this information into a single decision.
No simple statements can be easily made regarding what
clinical, demographic, angiographic, or biochemical variables are
being used (or in what way) by clinicians to make their decision in
this particular scenario. An increased number of patients could
potentially permit statistical power for exploratory subgroup and
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